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OBITER DICTA
"An obiter dictuma, in the language of the law, is a gratuitous opinion, an
individual impertinence, which, whether it be wise or foolish, right or wrong,
bindeth none-not even the lips that utter it."*
Tn- SINs oF TH PAMNT
Illustrative of the vitality that seems to be a peculiar property of dicta, witness the
resistance of the New York doctrine of imputed negligence to the continued effort to
destroy it. We refer to the tort rule whereby the courts have
Visited Upon
visited upon the child the wrongdoing of its parent by depriving the child of recovery against a negligent defendant
Child
because of the parent's contributory negligence. The doctrine
in New York had its origin in dicta. In 1839, Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. 615 (N. Y.
1839) placed its decision for the defendant on the ground of unavoidable accident.
The court proceeded to embellish its decision with the casual remark that even had
there been negligence on the defendant's part, no recovery would have been allowed to
the infant-plaintiff. The parents' carelessness would have vitiated its cause of action.
Gratuitous as the statement was, it gradually became firmly imbedded in the law.
Morrison v. Erie Ry., 56 N. Y. 302 (1874).
But no sooner was it engraved on the tablets of the law than an extreme distaste
appeared. Again and again an effort was made to eradicate it with the acid of juristic
attack. It was denounced [Regan v. Internationi Ry., 205
The Common
App. Div. 425, 426, 199 N. Y. Supp. 601, 602 (4th Dep't
Law
1923)]; it was slyly ridiculed. [Bellifontaine & Indiana Ry.
v. Snyder, 18 Ohio St. 399, 98 Am. Dec. 175 (1868).] But
the judicial stylus had etched too deeply into the tablet. Ironically enough, although
the doctrine originated out of dictum the subsequent efforts of the court to eradicate
the anomaly by the same means was ineffective. The New York courts looked longingly
at other states where the Vermont rule denying the doctrine of imputed negligence is
followed. [Robinson v. Cone, 22 Vt. 213, 54 Am. Dec. 67 (1850)]; and in Cailfornia
where the New York rule was first adopted and later overruled. Zarzane v. Nve
Drug Co., 180 Cal. 32, 179 Pac. 203 (1919). An attempt to soften the doctrine was
made in later New York cases by permitting a recovery for the child unless the child
had done something that would amount to negligence in an adult. Lannen v. Albany
Gas Light Co., 46 Barb. 264 (N. Y. 1865); Kupchins~y v. Vacuum Oil Co., 263 N. Y.
128, 188 N. E. 278 (1933).

But even the wishful eye of the New York courts could

still see in the modified rule traces of the overbearing severity of the original doctrine.
Finally the task of erasure was entrusted to the legislature. In 1935, Section 73 of
the DO=STIc RELATIONS LAw was enacted. It provided: "In an action by an infant
to recover damages for personal injury the contributory negliThe Statute
gence of the infant's parent or other custodian shall not be
imputed to the infant." But in Delia v. DeSena, N. Y. L. J.,
July 23, 1937, p. 215, col. 5, an action by a parent as administrator for the death of his
child, the statute was held to be inapplicable. The court reluctantly denied the
plaintiff recovery because he had been contributorily negligent and was the parent of
the child. The court observed: "No one could urge that our legislature intended to give
greater rights to one who killed an infant than to him who has merely injured the
child, yet that is exactly what has resulted from the amendment."
BMXLa.L, Osrrim DICTA (1885) title page.
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However, the legislature may not have erred as grievously as the court intimates.
Many states which follow the Vermont rule deny recovery to the parent in actions to
recover for the death of the child. Commenting on Smith v.
Hestonville Ry., 92 Pa. St. 450 (1880), Thompson says: "In
The Pending
this case defendants were clearly negligent, and recovery would
Problem
have been allowed if the child had been maimed instead of
killed." 3 TiomPsoON, NEGLIGENCE (2d ed. 1902) 537. The eminent text writer is
neither shocked nor alarmed at that result. In the Smith case, the parent suing as
administrator was the sole beneficiary and distributee of the fund to be recovered in
the action. A parent whose negligence has been a contributing cause of his child's
death should not be permitted to profit by it. It does not appear in the Delia case
whether the administrator was such sole beneficiary. If so, the accidental failure of
the legislature to wash away completely the careless line of Hartfield v. Roper might be
justified.
TOAST OF THE TOWN
An unprecedented legal problem, presented to an attorney, is a stimulant par excellence. Frequently he is stirred not alone by the final result but by the novelty ol
the litigated question. A challenge to the lawyer's analytical
powers is latent in a news item which appeared in the New
A Mixed
Drink
York Times, August 2, 1937, p. 21, col. 5. It is there related
that in the state of Kansas, the potency of 3.2 beer has been
magically diluted by legislative fiat. Such alcoholic content has been declared nonintoxicating in sharp contrast with the .5 standard fixed by the Volstead Act during the
prohibition era. The report states that a citizen of Kansas was hauled before the Bar
for being intoxicated while driving an automobile. His unique defense was that the
only beverage that he had imbibed was 3.2 per cent beer. Immediately there is
suggested a problem that well may send the legal minds a-reeling. What should the
courts do in the face of the legislative decree?
Perhaps a clue for the liberation of this defendant is found in a case in New York
of recent vintage. People v. Koch, 250 App. Div. 623, 294 N. Y. Supp. 987 (2d Dep't
1937). The defendant therein was convicted of violating a state statute similar to the
one in the principal case. N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW (1933) § 70 (5). On
appeal, the court reversed the conviction on the ground that although the defendant
was intoxicated, his condition was caused by the inadvertent overdose of the drug,
luminal. His intoxication was not voluntary and, said the court: "the statute contemplates only voluntary intoxication." [See similarly New York Times, August 17
and 18, 1937, p. 21 ("insulin shock" by a diabetic)].
Hence involuntary intoxication seeps through as a defense. This doctrine is rarely
used and strictly limited. An investigation of the New York cases offers no further
amplification. Although actual adjudications on the subject
A New
are not numerous, the legal cellar of another jurisdiction is
Recipe
much better stocked, and we find Johnson v. Commonwealth,
135 Va. 524, 115 S. E. 673, 30 A. L. R. 755 (1923) saturated
with discussion. Claiming that intoxication is involuntary when whiskey is absorbed
without the advice of a doctor to relieve a stubborn toothache, the accused demanded
his freedom. This gentleman evidently saw eye to eye with Horace: "For to the
abstemious has the god ordained that everything be hard, nor are the cankering cares
dispelled except by Bacchus' gift." Refusing to take cognizance of this plea, the court
expounded the true test of involuntary intoxication as "the absence of an exercise of
independent judgment and volition on the part of the accused in taking the intoxicant,
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as for example, when he has been made drunk by fraudulent contrivance of others,
by casualty, or by error of his physician." This court does not explain what is meant
by casualty. However, in Choate v. State, 19 Okla. Crim. Rep. 169, 197 Pac. 1060
(1921), it was held that if one imbibes freely a medicinal alcoholic preparation without
knowing its properties or ingredients, intoxication therefrom is not wilfd. Could this
be the meaning of "casualty"?
If so, the rule in its entirety now fits exactly the facts of the original problem pending
in Kansas. Did our Kansan manifest "an absence of exercise of independent judgment" as to the overcoming powers of his thirst-quencher? It
Another
might be said that he was reliably informed that it was lawful
Casualwty
and refreshing, and that he was officially advised that it was
non-intoxicating. It might even be argued that he was "lulled
into a sense of security" by the very men he had sent to Topeka to represent himand instability was the reward for his credulity! Thus, the doctrine of involuntary
intoxication "brewed" in Virginia and New York, may be uncorked to serve the lawabiding citizen of Kansas.

